IDA, Scheme no 169/b Indore

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The respondents (herein after mention as 'writ petitioners') filed the aforesaid writ petition being aggrieved by order dated 22.8.2013 passed by IDA whereby "No Objection Certificate" (NOC) issued on 24.5.2012 in respect of land bearing Survey Nos. 282, 328/1, 328/2, 328/3 and 329/1 total area 5.603 Hect. has been cancelled. The writ petitioners assailed the aforesaid order on the ground that the IDA has no authority to review its own order. According to the writ petitioners, their land was included in the Scheme and they had a development permission, therefore, the IDA rightly passed the resolution No.174 dated 3.11.2011 to release all the lands in question. Vide order dated 25.6.2018, this Court allowed the writ R.P. No. 1375/2018 petition by quashing the order dated 22.8.2013 so also the resolution dated 28.5.2013. The writ petition was allowed with costs of Rs.25,000/- as the respondents No.3 & 4 (IDA) have acted arbitrarily.

3. Now, the IDA has filed the present review petition by submitting that the development permission was granted on 4.8.2006 only in respect of land bearing Survey No.329/1 admeasuring 1.586 Hect. and the development permission for the remaining land i.e. land bearing Survey Nos. 327/1, 328/1, 328/2, and 382 admeasuring 10.920 Hect. was granted on 15.5.2009 i.e. much after the publication of Notification u/s. 50(2) of the M.P. Nagar Tatha Gram Nivesh Adhiniyam, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as "the Adhiniyam"), therefore, only the land bearing Survey No.329/1 was liable to be released from the Scheme and not the remaining land, hence, the impugned order passed in the writ petition is liable to be reviewed to that extent. Undisputedly this fact was not brought to the knowledge of writ court by either of the parties.

4. I have heard Shri Rishi Tiwari, learned counsel appearing for the IDA and Shri V.K. Jain, learned senior counsel appearing for the writ petitioners at length and perused the material available on record.

5. On 4.8.2006, the Town & Country Planning Department granted the development permission to the writ petitioners for the land bearing Survey No.329/1 admeasuring 1.586 Hect. for a period of three years. On 11.7.2008, IDA passed the resolution No.198 u/s. 50(1) of the Adhiniyam to develop Scheme No.169-B. On 13.7.2008 and 1.8.2008, IDA published the declaration u/s. 50(2) of the Adhiniyam. After R.P. No. 1375/2018 almost 9 months of the aforesaid publication, on 15.5.2009, Town & Country Planning Department granted the permission to the writ petitioners No.1 to 3 for development of land bearing Survey Nos. 327/1, 328/1, 328/2, and 382 admeasuring 10.920 Hect. Thereafter, the IDA published the Draft Scheme on 23.10.2009. Meanwhile, vide order dated 17.2.2010, the development permission was extended from 4.8.2009 to 3.8.2010 in respect of land bearing Survey No.329/1. Writ petitioners No. 1 to 3 and 5 submitted their objection u/s. 50(3) of the Adhiniyam on 19.3.2010 objecting the inclusion of their lands on the ground that they are having development permission prior to the inclusion of their entire land in the development scheme. Vide order dated 16.8.2010, the IDA had rejected the objections u/s. 50(4) of the Adhiniyam. Thereafter, Final Scheme was published on 15.10.2010.

6. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid Final Publication writ petitioners filed the revision u/s. 51 of the Adhiniyam on 5.11.2010 before the Commissioner, Dy. Director, Town & Country Planning. Vide order dated 26.4.2011, the revision was allowed and the matter was remitted back to the IDA for reconsideration. The IDA reconsidered the matter in its meeting and vide resolution No.174 dated 3.11.2011 has decided to issue NOC to the writ petitioners for the land of sr. no.282,328/1,328/2,328/3&329/1 total area 5.603 hect. of Village -Malakhedi subject to return of development fees. On 17.5.2012, an agreement was executed between the writ petitioners and the IDA and thereafter, IDA issued the NOC releasing the land admeasuring 5.603 Hect. The writ petitioners have deposited amount of Rs.1,02,96,550/- under the head of R.P. No. 1375/2018 development charges. Therefore, it is clear from the aforesaid order, the IDA itself had released the aforesaid lands of the writ petitioners by passing a resolution No.174 dated 3.11.2011.

7. Later on, vide resolution No.115 dated 28.5.2013, the IDA has cancelled the previous resolution No.174 dated 3.11.2011 on the ground that no development work was done by the writ petitioners and the development permission had already expired. It is important to note here that neither before the Revisional authority nor while passing the resolution passed by the Board this fact escaped from consideration that the development permission for the remaining land i.e. land bearing Survey Nos. 327/1, 328/1, 328/2, and 382 was granted after the publication of Notification u/s. 50(2) of the Adhiniyam. Shri Rishi Tiwari Learned counsel appearing for the IDA fairly admits that even in the writ petition before this Court, this fact was not brought to the knowledge by the IDA and this Court has decided the writ petition in respect of the sr. no.282,328/1,328/2,328/3&329/1 total area 5.603 hect. of Village -Malakhedi. Hence there is no error apparent on the face of the order dated 25.6.2018 passed in the writ petition. All the facts and the documents were in the knowledge of the IDA, but for the reasons best known to them, neither before the Revisional authority nor in its Board-meeting dated 3.11.2011 and 28.5.2013, this fact was placed for consideration.

8. Learned counsel appearing for the IDA further submits that the writ petitioners submitted an application before the Chief Executive Officer, IDA on 19.3.2010 and in Para 2 of it, they did not disclose the correct and complete facts in respect of grant of development permissions on different dates . Para 2 R.P. No. 1375/2018 of the aforesaid application is reproduced below :

" 2@ xzke ikyk[ksMh ds 327@1 328@2 328@3 328@3 329@1 ,oa 282 dqy jdck 12-506 gsDVj Hkwfe la;qDr lapkyd uxj rFkk xzke fuos'k bUnkSj }kjk i= dzekad 5923 fnukad 04&08&06 dks Lohad`r djk;k x;k Rkn~i'pkr i= dzekad 1115 fnukad 17&2&2010 }kjk iqu% Lohd`fr izkIr dh xbZ rFkk i= dzekad 2572 fnukad 15&5&09 Lohd`r vfHkU;kl dh Nk;kizfr ,oa i= dh Nk;kizfr layXu gSA"

In the aforesaid paragraph, the writ petitioners have mentioned the date of order as 4.8.2006, 17.2.2010 and 15.5.2009 by which the developments permission were granted for all the lands, but the fact remains that the development permission for land bearing Survey No.329/1 was granted on 4.8.2006 and the development permission for the remaining land bearing Survey Nos. 327/1, 328/1, 328/2, and 382 was granted on 15.5.2009 much after the publication of Notification. The writ petitioners did not elaborate the aforesaid facts in their application and the entire lands were considered for release keeping in view the fact that the writ petitioners are having development permission for the entire lands prior to the issuance of Notification u/s. 50(1) of the Adhiniyam. The Revisional authority in its order dated 26.4.2011 has mentioned that "this fact is undisputed that the land bearing Survey Nos. 327/1, 328/1, 328/2, 328/3, 329/1 and 282 the development permission had been granted by the Office of Town & Country Planning, Indore on 4.8.2006 i.e. prior to the Notification issued u/s. 50(1) of the Adhiniyam and for which the land owners are entitled for the benefit of Section 50". The relevant paragraph of order dated 26.4.2011 is reproduced below:

"mHk;i{kksa ds rdZ ,oa vfHkys[kks ds voyksdu ds i'pkr ;g fufoZokn rF; gS fd izkFkhZx.k dh Hkwfe losZ dzekad 327@1] 328@1 328@2 328@3 329@1 ,oa 282 R.P. No. 1375/2018 dqy jdck 12-506 gsDVj Hkwfe ij vkoklh; mi;ksx gsrq fodkl vuqKk la;qDr lapkyd] uxj rFkk xzke fuos'k ftyk dk;kZy; bUnkSj ds i= dzekad 5923 ,oa 5926@bUnkSj fnukad 4-8-2006 }kjk iznk; dh xbZ FkhA mDr fodkl vuqKk izfrizkFkhZ }kjk vf/kfu;e dh /kkjk 50¼1½ ds rgr izdkf'kr lwpuk fnukad 5-1-2008 ds iwoZ dh Fkh] rks bl izdj.k esa /kkjk 53 dk ykHk izkf/kdkjh }kjk vihykFkhZ dks fn;k tkuk pkfg, Fkk D;ksafd /kkjk 30 esa izkIr fodkl vuqKkvksa dks n`f"Vxr j[krs gq, /kkjk 53 ds izko/kkuksa dk ikyu djuk izkf/kdkjh dh ftEesnkjh curh gSA "

9. The IDA did not challenge the above order and on the basis of aforesaid order, the IDA took a decision in its meeting held on 3.11.2011 to release the land sr.

no.282,328/1,328/2,328/3&329/1 total area 5.603 hect. of Village -Malakhedi belonging to the writ petitioners. In furtherance of the above an agreement had also been executed; writ petitioners have returned the amount towards development- fees; and thereafter IDA had passed the resolution dated 28.5.2013 cancelling the earlier resolution. Therefore, the IDA has committed the mistakes on various stages, and all the above orders and resolution of the board cannot be reviewed or recalled by recalling the order passed in writ petition. Much water has flown and clock cannot be put back.

10. The IDA has filed this review petition on the discovery the fact that the development permission for the remaining land i.e. land bearing Survey Nos. 327/1, 328/1, 328/2, and 382 admeasuring 10.920 Hect. was granted on 15.5.2009 i.e. much after the publication of Notification u/s. 50(2) of the M.P. Nagar Tatha Gram Nivesh Adhiniyam, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as "the Adhiniyam"), therefore, only the land bearing Survey No.329/1 was liable to be released from the Scheme and not the remaining land.

R.P. No. 1375/2018

11. The point which is under consideration is whether on discovery of this fact,which after the exercise of due diligence, was not within knowledge of the IDA or could not be produced before this court, the review of the order dated 25.6.2018 passed by this Court in W.P. No.4444/2014 is permissible ?

12. The Hon,ble Apex court in case of Kamlesh Verma Vs. Mayawati ,reported in (2013) 8 SCC 320 has summarised the principles of review, the relevant para are reproduce below :-

8. The only point for consideration in this petition is whether the review petitioner has made out a case for reviewing the judgment and order dated 6-7-2012 and satisfies the criteria for entertaining the same in review jurisdiction?

Review jurisdiction

9. Article 137 of the Constitution of India provides for review of judgments or orders by the Supreme Court which reads as under:

"137. Review of judgments or orders by the Supreme Court.

--Subject to the provisions of any law made by Parliament or any rules made under Article 145, the Supreme Court shall have power to review any judgment pronounced or order made by it."

10. Order 47 Rule 1(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 provides for an application for review which reads as under:

"1. Application for review of judgment.--(1) Any person considering himself aggrieved--

(a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed, but from which no appeal has been preferred,

(b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed, or

(c) by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small Causes, and who, from the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or order made, or on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, or for any other sufficient reason, desires to obtain a review of the decree passed or order made against him, may apply for a review of judgment to the court which passed the decree or made the order."

11. Further, Part VIII Order 40 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966 deals with the review and consists of four rules. Rule 1 is important for our purpose which reads as under:

"1. The Court may review its judgment or order, but no application for review will be entertained in a civil proceeding except on the ground mentioned in Order 47 Rule R.P. No. 1375/2018 1 of the Code, and in a criminal proceeding except on the ground of an error apparent on the face of the record."

12. This Court has repeatedly held in various judgments that the jurisdiction and scope of review is not that of an appeal and it can be entertained only if there is an error apparent on the face of the record. A mere repetition through different counsel, of old and overruled arguments, a second trip over ineffectually covered grounds or minor mistakes of inconsequential import are obviously insufficient. This Court in Sow Chandra Kante v. Sk. Habib held as under: (SCC p. 675, para 1) "1. Mr Daphtary, learned counsel for the petitioners, has argued at length all the points which were urged at the earlier stage when we refused special leave thus making out that a review proceeding virtually amounts to a rehearing. May be, we were not right in refusing special leave in the first round; but, once an order has been passed by this Court, a review thereof must be subject to the rules of the game and cannot be lightly entertained. A review of a judgment is a serious step and reluctant resort to it is proper only where a glaring omission or patent mistake or like grave error has crept in earlier by judicial fallibility. A mere repetition, through different counsel, of old and overruled arguments, a second trip over ineffectually covered ground or minor mistakes of inconsequential import are obviously insufficient. The very strict need for compliance with these factors is the rationale behind the insistence of counsel's certificate which should not be a routine affair or a habitual step. It is neither fairness to the court which decided nor awareness of the precious public time lost what with a huge backlog of dockets waiting in the queue for disposal, for counsel to issue easy certificates for entertainment of review and fight over again the same battle which has been fought and lost. The Bench and the Bar, we are sure, are jointly concerned in the conservation of judicial time for maximum use. We regret to say that this case is typical of the unfortunate but frequent phenomenon of repeat performance with the review label as passport. Nothing which we did not hear then has been heard now, except a couple of rulings on points earlier put forward. May be, as counsel now urges and then pressed, our order refusing special leave was capable of a different course. The present stage is not a virgin ground but review of an earlier order which has the normal feature of finality."

(emphasis in original)

13. In a criminal proceeding, review is permissible on the ground of an error apparent on the face of the record. A review proceeding cannot be equated with the original hearing of the case. In Northern India Caterers (India) Ltd. v. Lt. Governor of Delhi, this Court, in paras 8 and 9 held as under: (SCC pp. 171-72) R.P. No. 1375/2018 "8. It is well settled that a party is not entitled to seek a review of a judgment delivered by this Court merely for the purpose of a rehearing and a fresh decision of the case. The normal principle is that a judgment pronounced by the Court is final, and departure from that principle is justified only when circumstances of a substantial and compelling character make it necessary to do so: Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan. For instance, if the attention of the Court is not drawn to a material statutory provision during the original hearing, the Court will review its judgment: Girdhari Lal Gupta v. D.H. Mehta. The Court may also reopen its judgment if a manifest wrong has been done and it is necessary to pass an order to do full and effective justice: O.N. Mohindroo v. District Judge, Delhi. Power to review its judgments has been conferred on the Supreme Court by Article 137 of the Constitution, and that power is subject to the provisions of any law made by Parliament or the rules made under Article 145. In a civil proceeding, an application for review is entertained only on a ground mentioned in Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and in a criminal proceeding on the ground of an error apparent on the face of the record (Order 40 Rule 1 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966). But whatever the nature of the proceeding, it is beyond dispute that a review proceeding cannot be equated with the original hearing of the case, and the finality of the judgment delivered by the Court will not be reconsidered except 'where a glaring omission or patent mistake or like grave error has crept in earlier by judicial fallibility': Sow Chandra Kante v. Sk. Habib.

9. Now, besides the fact that most of the legal material so assiduously collected and placed before us by the learned Additional Solicitor General, who has now been entrusted to appear for the respondent, was never brought to our attention when the appeals were heard, we may also examine whether the judgment suffers from an error apparent on the face of the record. Such an error exists if of two or more views canvassed on the point it is possible to hold that the controversy can be said to admit of only one of them. If the view adopted by the Court in the original judgment is a possible view having regard to what the record states, it is difficult to hold that there is an error apparent on the face of the record."

14. Review of the earlier order cannot be done unless the court is satisfied that material error, manifest on the face of the order, undermines its soundness or results in miscarriage of justice. This Court in Col. Avtar Singh Sekhon v. Union of India held as under: (SCC p. 566, para 12) "12. A review is not a routine procedure. Here we resolved to hear Shri Kapil at length to remove any feeling that the party R.P. No. 1375/2018 has been hurt without being heard. But we cannot review our earlier order unless satisfied that material error, manifest on the face of the order, undermines its soundness or results in miscarriage of justice. In Sow Chandra Kante v. Sk. Habib this Court observed: (SCC p. 675, para 1) '1. ... A review of a judgment is a serious step and reluctant resort to it is proper only where a glaring omission or patent mistake or like grave error has crept in earlier by judicial fallibility. ... The present stage is not a virgin ground but review of an earlier order which has the normal feature of finality.'"

15. An error which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record justifying the Court to exercise its power of review. A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is reheard and corrected, but lies only for patent error. This Court in Parsion Devi v. Sumitri Deviheld as under: (SCC pp. 718-19, paras 7-9) "7. It is well settled that review proceedings have to be strictly confined to the ambit and scope of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. In Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. v. Govt. of A.P. this Court opined: (AIR p. 1377, para 11) '11. What, however, we are now concerned with is whether the statement in the order of September 1959 that the case did not involve any substantial question of law is an "error apparent on the face of the record". The fact that on the earlier occasion the court held on an identical state of facts that a substantial question of law arose would not per se be conclusive, for the earlier order itself might be erroneous. Similarly, even if the statement was wrong, it would not follow that it was an "error apparent on the face of the record", for there is a distinction which is real, though it might not always be capable of exposition, between a mere erroneous decision and a decision which could be characterised as vitiated by "error apparent". A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is reheard and corrected, but lies only for patent error.'

8. Again, in Meera Bhanja v. Nirmala Kumari Choudhury while quoting with approval a passage from Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma v. Aribam Pishak Sharmathis Court once again held that review proceedings are not by way of an appeal and have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC.

9. Under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC a judgment may be open to review inter alia if there is a mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record. An error which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record justifying the court to exercise its power of review under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. In exercise of the jurisdiction under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC it is not permissible for an erroneous R.P. No. 1375/2018 decision to be 'reheard and corrected'. A review petition, it must be remembered has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be 'an appeal in disguise'."

16. Error contemplated under the Rule must be such which is apparent on the face of the record and not an error which has to be fished out and searched. It must be an error of inadvertence. The power of review can be exercised for correction of a mistake but not to substitute a view. The mere possibility of two views on the subject is not a ground for review. This Court, in Lily Thomas v. Union of India held as under: (SCC pp. 250-53, paras 54, 56 & 58) "54. Article 137 empowers this Court to review its judgments subject to the provisions of any law made by Parliament or any rules made under Article 145 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court Rules made in exercise of the powers under Article 145of the Constitution prescribe that in civil cases, review lies on any of the grounds specified in Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure which provides:

'1. Application for review of judgment.--(1) Any person considering himself aggrieved--

(a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed, but from which no appeal has been preferred,

(b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed, or

(c) by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small Causes, and who, from the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or order made, or on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, or for any other sufficient reason, desires to obtain a review of the decree passed or order made against him, may apply for a review of judgment to the court which passed the decree or made the order.' Under Order 40 Rule 1 of the Supreme Court Rules no review lies except on the ground of error apparent on the face of the record in criminal cases. Order 40 Rule 5 of the Supreme Court Rules provides that after an application for review has been disposed of no further application shall be entertained in the same matter.

* * *

56. It follows, therefore, that the power of review can be exercised for correction of a mistake but not to substitute a view.

Such powers can be exercised within the limits of the statute dealing with the exercise of power. The review cannot be treated like an appeal in disguise. The mere possibility of two views on the subject is not a ground for review. Once a review petition is dismissed no further petition of review can be entertained. The rule of law of following the practice of the binding nature of the larger Benches and not taking different views by the Benches of coordinated jurisdiction of equal strength has to be followed and R.P. No. 1375/2018 practised. However, this Court in exercise of its powers underArticle 136 or Article 32 of the Constitution and upon satisfaction that the earlier judgments have resulted in deprivation of fundamental rights of a citizen or rights created under any other statute, can take a different view notwithstanding the earlier judgment.

* * *

58. Otherwise also no ground as envisaged under Order 40 of the Supreme Court Rules read with Order 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure has been pleaded in the review petition or canvassed before us during the arguments for the purposes of reviewing the judgment in Sarla Mudgal case. It is not the case of the petitioners that they have discovered any new and important matter which after the exercise of due diligence was not within their knowledge or could not be brought to the notice of the Court at the time of passing of the judgment. All pleas raised before us were in fact addressed for and on behalf of the petitioners before the Bench which, after considering those pleas, passed the judgment in Sarla Mudgal case. We have also not found any mistake or error apparent on the face of the record requiring a review. Error contemplated under the rule must be such which is apparent on the face of the record and not an error which has to be fished out and searched. It must be an error of inadvertence. No such error has been pointed out by the learned counsel appearing for the parties seeking review of the judgment. The only arguments advanced were that the judgment interpreting Section 494 amounted to violation of some of the fundamental rights. No other sufficient cause has been shown for reviewing the judgment. The words 'any other sufficient reason appearing in Order 47 Rule 1 CPC' must mean 'a reason sufficient on grounds at least analogous to those specified in the rule' as was held in Chhajju Ram v. Neki and approved by this Court in Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos v. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius. Error apparent on the face of the proceedings is an error which is based on clear ignorance or disregard of the provisions of law. In T.C. Basappa v. T. Nagappa, this Court held that such error is an error which is a patent error and not a mere wrong decision. In Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmad Ishaque, it was held: (AIR p. 244, para 23) '23. ... [I]t is essential that it should be something more than a mere error; it must be one which must be manifest on the face of the record. The real difficulty with reference to this matter, however, is not so much in the statement of the principle as in its application to the facts of a particular case. When does an error cease to be mere error, and become an error apparent on the face of the record? The learned counsel on either side were unable to suggest any clear-cut rule by which the boundary between the two classes of errors could be demarcated. Mr Pathak for the first respondent contended on the strength of R.P. No. 1375/2018 certain observations of Chagla, C.J. in Batuk K. Vyas v. Surat Borough Municipality, that no error could be said to be apparent on the face of the record if it was not self-evident and if it required an examination or argument to establish it. This test might afford a satisfactory basis for decision in the majority of cases. But there must be cases in which even this test might break down, because judicial opinions also differ, and an error that might be considered by one Judge as self-evident might not be so considered by another. The fact is that what is an error apparent on the face of the record cannot be defined precisely or exhaustively, there being an element of indefiniteness inherent in its very nature, and it must be left to be determined judicially on the facts of each case.' Therefore, it can safely be held that the petitioners have not made out any case within the meaning of Article 137 read with Order 40 of the Supreme Court Rules and Order 47 Rule 1 CPC for reviewing the judgment in Sarla Mudgal case. The petition is misconceived and bereft of any substance."

17. In a review petition, it is not open to the Court to reappreciate the evidence and reach a different conclusion, even if that is possible. Conclusion arrived at on appreciation of evidence cannot be assailed in a review petition unless it is shown that there is an error apparent on the face of the record or for some reason akin thereto. This Court in Kerala SEB v. Hitech Electrothermics & Hydropower Ltd. held as under: (SCC p. 656, para 10) "10. ... In a review petition it is not open to this Court to reappreciate the evidence and reach a different conclusion, even if that is possible. The learned counsel for the Board at best sought to impress us that the correspondence exchanged between the parties did not support the conclusion reached by this Court. We are afraid such a submission cannot be permitted to be advanced in a review petition. The appreciation of evidence on record is fully within the domain of the appellate court. If on appreciation of the evidence produced, the court records a finding of fact and reaches a conclusion, that conclusion cannot be assailed in a review petition unless it is shown that there is an error apparent on the face of the record or for some reason akin thereto. It has not been contended before us that there is any error apparent on the face of the record. To permit the review petitioner to argue on a question of appreciation of evidence would amount to converting a review petition into an appeal in disguise."

18. Review is not rehearing of an original matter. The power of review cannot be confused with appellate power which enables a superior court to correct all errors committed by a subordinate court. A repetition of old and overruled argument is not enough to reopen concluded adjudications. This Court in Jain Studios Ltd. v. Shin Satellite Public Co. Ltd., held as R.P. No. 1375/2018 under: (SCC pp. 504-505, paras 11-12) "11. So far as the grievance of the applicant on merits is concerned, the learned counsel for the opponent is right in submitting that virtually the applicant seeks the same relief which had been sought at the time of arguing the main matter and had been negatived. Once such a prayer had been refused, no review petition would lie which would convert rehearing of the original matter. It is settled law that the power of review cannot be confused with appellate power which enables a superior court to correct all errors committed by a subordinate court. It is not rehearing of an original matter. A repetition of old and overruled argument is not enough to reopen concluded adjudications. The power of review can be exercised with extreme care, caution and circumspection and only in exceptional cases.

12. When a prayer to appoint an arbitrator by the applicant herein had been made at the time when the arbitration petition was heard and was rejected, the same relief cannot be sought by an indirect method by filing a review petition. Such petition, in my opinion, is in the nature of 'second innings' which is impermissible and unwarranted and cannot be granted."

19. Review proceedings are not by way of an appeal and have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. In review jurisdiction, mere disagreement with the view of the judgment cannot be the ground for invoking the same. As long as the point is already dealt with and answered, the parties are not entitled to challenge the impugned judgment in the guise that an alternative view is possible under the review jurisdiction.

Summary of the principles

20. Thus, in view of the above, the following grounds of review are maintainable as stipulated by the statute:

20.1. When the review will be maintainable:

(i) Discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within knowledge of the petitioner or could not be produced by him;

(ii) Mistake or error apparent on the face of the record;

(iii) Any other sufficient reason.

The words "any other sufficient reason" have been interpreted in Chhajju Ram v. Neki and approved by this Court in Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos v. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius to mean "a reason sufficient on grounds at least analogous to those specified in the rule". The same principles have been reiterated in Union of India v. Sandur Manganese & Iron Ores Ltd.

20.2. When the review will not be maintainable:

(i) A repetition of old and overruled argument is not enough to reopen concluded adjudications.

(ii) Minor mistakes of inconsequential import.

(iii) Review proceedings cannot be equated with the original R.P. No. 1375/2018 hearing of the case.

(iv) Review is not maintainable unless the material error, manifest on the face of the order, undermines its soundness or results in miscarriage of justice.

(v) A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is reheard and corrected but lies only for patent error.

(vi) The mere possibility of two views on the subject cannot be a ground for review.

(vii) The error apparent on the face of the record should not be an error which has to be fished out and searched.

(viii) The appreciation of evidence on record is fully within the domain of the appellate court, it cannot be permitted to be advanced in the review petition.

(ix) Review is not maintainable when the same relief sought at the time of arguing the main matter had been negatived.

It is clear from the above verdict that review will be maintainable upon discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within knowledge of the petitioner or could not be produced by him . It is not case of the IDA that this new fact that fact that the development permission for the remaining land i.e. land bearing Survey Nos. 327/1, 328/1, 328/2, and 382 admeasuring 10.920 Hect. was granted on 15.5.2009 i.e. much after the publication of Notification u/s. 50(2) was not in their knowledge or could not be produced after due diligence.

Hence, in view of the above discussion no case is made out for review / recall of the order dated 25.6.2018 passed by this Court in W.P. No.4444/2014.

13. In view of the foregoing discussion, this review petition is hereby dismi